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Introduction 
“Natural beauty takes at least two hours in front of a mirror.”1 
It is almost unanimously
2
 agreed that women have made considerable advances in society 
over the last few decades, especially as a result of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
3
 A 
primary purpose of the Act was to prohibit employers from fashioning their “personnel policies 
on the basis of assumptions about the differences between men and women, whether or not the 
assumptions were valid.”4 Or, to put it differently, Congress’s intent was “the removal of 
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate 
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.“5  
In some instances, the law has been interpreted to clearly prohibit certain behavior by 
employers. For example, they may not terminate a female employee for refusing to engage in 
sexual relations with them
6
 nor may they make severe, pervasive and unwelcome sexual 
advances.
7
  However, the law is less clear in regards to several other aspects of gender-based 
employment discrimination.  
                                                            
1 Mike Sager, What I’ve Learned: Pamela Anderson, ESQUIRE MAGAZINE (2004). 
2 For a counterargument, see generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE 
AND LAW 16 (1987) (arguing that current sex equality laws are ineffective because they do not go far enough to 
provide “a chance at productive lives of reasonable physical security, self-expression, individuation, and minimal 
respect and dignity”). 
3 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1964). 
Title VII states, in relevant part, that it is illegal “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of  such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 
4City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978). 
5 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
6 See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
7See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). 
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Courts have wrestled with the issue of what appearance regulations are appropriate under 
Title VII.  Women and men dress differently, including at work. As a result, employers 
implement appearance requirements which purport to recognize these differences.
8
 This is not 
limited to the private sector; the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, the very agency that 
prosecutes employers for violations of the state antidiscrimination laws, imposes a gender 
specific dress code.
9
 
This paper will begin by discussing the line of cases involving appearance regulation in 
the workplace to demonstrate how courts have moved from complete deference to employers in 
imposing dress codes to recognizing that some situations should not be tolerated, culminating in 
the “unequal burden” test. Next, the shortcomings of this test will be analyzed to show that it 
reinforces social norms which inherently “unequally burden” women. I will also discuss some of 
the solutions that have been offered, namely the argument to change the test to the same used for 
immutable traits, the McDonnell test. Part V demonstrates how appearance regulation uniquely 
affects African American women and why any test must take that into consideration. Finally I 
posit a test which allows for dress code policies when they don’t overly burden men or women 
and which recognizes “manifestations” of their immutable traits. Put another way, the unequal 
                                                            
8 See infra, Part I. 
9 E-mail from Human Resources, New Jersey Attorney General’s Office, Division of Law, to All Employees (July 
13, 2012) (on file with author). 
 
“Business Attire – Monday through Thursday  
Men:  Suits or sport coats with dress slacks, dress shirts, ties, dress shoes or boots.  
Women:  Suits with pants or skirts, dresses, dress slacks, skirts, shirts, blouses, sweaters, knit tops 
or vests, jackets, heels, flats or boots.  
Business Casual Attire:  
Men: Casual slacks or pants including khakis, shirts with or without collars, sweaters, loafers, or 
deck shoes.  
Women: Slacks, khakis, capris, skirts, casual dresses, blouses, sweaters, knit tops, shirts, boots, 
heels, flats, loafers or deck shoes.”… 
“Any employee who does not comply with the requirements of the work attire guidelines may be 
considered unfit for duty.”  
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burden test can still exist, but the analysis must recognize the inherent burden that women face in 
regards to appearance. Furthermore, the test must keep in mind the historical prejudice against 
African Americans and should allow for, specifically, afros and braided hair (“corn rows”).  
Part I: The “Unequal Burden” Test in Appearance Regulation 
 Title VII states that it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail 
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”10 
 The Supreme Court promulgated a test which laid the groundwork for any litigation 
brought under Title VII. This framework, articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
ultimately laid the foundation for the “unequal burden test” in appearance regulation (although as 
you will see, it is much easier to satisfy the unequal burden test). To establish a prima facie case, 
the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that (1) they are a member of a protected class, (2) they 
were qualified for the position in question, (3) the plaintiff was subject to a materially adverse 
employment action despite being so qualified, and (4) can show the court that the employer acted 
with a discriminatory motive.
11
 The burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that their 
decision-making was based on a legitimate business objective.
12
 Then the burden shifts back to 
the plaintiff to disprove the stated objective by showing that this was merely a pretext for a 
discriminatory motive.
13
 
                                                            
1042 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (1964). 
11 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
12 Id. 
13 See id. 
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Title VII does not prohibit all discrimination on the basis of sex.
14
 The statute explicitly 
allows discrimination when it is “reasonably necessary for the normal operations of that business 
or enterprise,” otherwise known as the “bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) 
exception.”15 Basically, this means that in instances where only a certain gender could perform 
the work at issue, employers may legally discriminate against the other gender. However, this 
exception is viewed by the Supreme Court as being extremely narrow.
16
 Exceptions have been 
found in relation to positions such as prison guards at maximum security prisons
17
 and 
businesses where “female sexuality [is] reasonably necessary to perform the dominant purpose of 
the job which is forthrightly to titillate and entice male customers.”18  
 The statute also protects against cases in which an employer discriminates intentionally 
against females or males but does so in addition to having a legitimate business motive.
19
 
Although this will not absolve an employer of all liability, they are presented a limited defense if 
they can show that they would have reached the same conclusion in regards to their employment 
practice even without the impermissible discriminatory purpose.
20
  
A. Appearance Regulation under Title VII 
                                                            
14 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243 (1989) (“The existence of the BFOQ exception shows 
Congress' unwillingness to require employers to change the very nature of their operations in response to the 
statute.”) 
15 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964). 
16 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). 
17  Id.. Alabama was allowed to prohibit female prison guards from working in certain areas of their maximum 
security prison due to fear of the safety of the women and the possibility of violent uproar among prisoners. 
18 St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 773, Case No. CFS 22618-70 (New York Human Rights Appeal Board, 
1971). Weber v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 774, Case No. CFS 22619-70 (New York Human Rights Appeal Board, 
1971). 
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1964). 
20 See generally Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
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Since the inception of the Civil Rights Act, courts have not viewed dress codes that treat 
women and men differently as discrimination based on gender per se; the reasoning being that 
this does not constitute disparate treatment for immutable characteristics.
21
 As a result, they 
originally did not subject these regulations to the test articulated in McDonnell. The first federal 
appellate case discussing appearance regulation, oddly enough, involved a male plaintiff. 
22
 In 
Baker v. California Land Title Co., the employee was fired for wearing long hair to work, and 
claimed discrimination based on gender because women at the site were permitted to have long 
hair while men were not. The Ninth Circuit stated that the purpose of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act was to prevent employers from discriminating in hiring practices on the basis of 
gender, not to prevent “regulations by employers of dress or cosmetic or grooming practices 
which an employer might think his particular business required.”23 The court made no mention 
of any concerns about additional burdens that these regulations may have on women, and 
deferred to the employer as to what was acceptable attire for their business.
24
 Other federal 
courts came to a similar conclusion in related cases,
25
 generally reasoning that “Congress sought 
only to give all persons equal access to the job market, not to limit an employer's right to 
exercise his informed judgment as to how best to run his shop.”26  
 Over time some courts did recognize that, theoretically, a policy which significantly 
                                                            
21 See infra, note 41. 
22 See generally Baker v. California Land Title Co, 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974). 
23Id. at 896. 
24Id. 
25 See generally Knott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publ. 
Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc), vacating 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973); Longo v. Carlisle De Coppet & 
Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fagan v. National 
Cash Register Co.,  481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
26 Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1092. 
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burdened one gender over another could be problematic under Title VII.
27
 In 1982, the Ninth 
Circuit implicitly recognized that its own wholesale acceptance of appearance regulation 
articulated in Baker was too broad.
28
 In Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, the validity of a policy 
requiring female flight hostesses to comply with strict weight requirements as a condition of their 
employment was challenged as sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
29
 Maintaining that 
differing weight requirements could generally be imposed on men and women, the court 
recognized that a Title VII violation was evident in this case, as the appearance policy imposed a 
“significantly greater burden of compliance” on females. 30 Male employees in similar positions 
had no weight requirement, and as a result “the airline could not successfully maintain that the 
image of slimness was the critical factor regardless of gender.”31 
 A weight requirement was, however, found valid in Air Line Pilots Asso., Int’l v. United 
Air Lines, Inc. There, United Air Lines imposed a weight requirement on both males and females 
with the stated goal of to achieving “a tasteful uniformity among the flight attendants as 
representatives of United, and to project a quality image of the flight attendants as clean, healthy, 
attractive individuals who take pride in themselves and their job.”32 The court refused to find 
disparate treatment even though males were allowed to weigh more than their female 
counterparts of the exact same height and build,
33
 and despite the fact that, in order to “make 
                                                            
27 See Knott, 527 F.2d at 1252 (Noting that the different requirements on men and women were “slight.”); See also 
Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 666 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (Stating that although employers could 
absolutely impose grooming requirements, they nevertheless held that a policy needed to apply equally to each 
gender. However, this seems limited to men being allowed to wear long hair when females are permitted to do so.). 
28 See generally Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982). 
29 Id. at 603. 
30Id. at 606. 
31 Id. at 610. 
32 Air Line Pilots Asso., Int’l v. United Air Lines, Inc., 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11790, *15-16 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 
1979) 
33 Id. at 17. 
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weight,” several women “resorted to extreme measures such as crash diets, steam baths, and 
diuretics in order to meet scheduled weigh-ins.”34 The struggles of those women who suffered 
emotional and physical distress were seen as indicative more of the wisdom, or lack thereof, or 
United’s policy but did not show a violation of Title VII.35  
 The Ninth Circuit tackled the issue of weight requirements in 2000.
36
 United Airlines 
imposed differing weight requirements on males and females, forcing “female flight attendants 
to weigh between 14 and 25 pounds less than their male colleagues of the same height and 
age.”37 The court struck down this policy, noting that the company had used statistical data for 
“medium sized” females and used that as the requirement but allowed for “large sized” males 
under the same model.
38
 The model was so outrageous that, using contemporary examples, the 
singer Shakira would likely be unfit to work at United Airlines. Additionally, Alana Beard, a 
WNBA star and Olympic athlete, would barely make the cut.
39
 Consequently, the female 
plaintiffs had successfully shown a disparate treatment from males that could not be justified. 
The court pointed out, however, that they “need not decide whether a rule or regulation that 
compels individuals to change or modify their physical structure or composition, as opposed to 
simply presenting themselves in a neat or acceptable manner, qualifies as an appearance 
standard.”40 Therefore, not only is it plausible that a company could still impose differing weight 
                                                            
34 Id. at 44. 
35 Id. The court did ultimately find that the plaintiffs had stated a viable claim, but only because the court determined 
that the Airline company had imposed the policy unevenly in granting substantially more exemptions to men than 
women. Had they not done so, then the policy would have withstood Title VII scrutiny. 
36 Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. Cal. 2000). 
37 Id. at 848 (“For example, the maximum weight for a 5' 7'', 30-year-old woman was 142 pounds, while a man of 
the same height and age could weigh up to 161 pounds. A 5' 11'', 50-year-old woman could weigh up to 162 pounds, 
while the limit for a man of the same height and age was 185 pounds.”). 
38 Id. at 854. 
39 Yahoo Sports, http://sports.yahoo.com  (last visited December 4, 2012). 
40 Id. 
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standards under this holding, but they could potentially ask for changes in the physical structure 
of employees as long as they were not overly burdensome on one gender. 
The seminal case discussing and, perhaps, cementing the “unequal burden” test was 
decided by the Ninth Circuit in 2006.
 41
 In Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co, Inc., a sports bar in 
a casino required females, but not males, to wear makeup as part of their “Personal Best” 
appearance policy.
42
 The business also required all female colleagues “to meet with professional 
image consultants who in turn created a facial template
43
 for each woman.”44 These consultants, 
among other things, instructed the employees on how to apply makeup.
45
 A female employee 
who refused to wear makeup was terminated and brought suit against her employer, alleging a 
Title VII violation.
46
 
The majority was unconvinced that the employer had unlawfully discriminated. 
Recognizing the view that different standards could be imposed on men and women, they found 
that the company’s “Personal Best” dress policy did not unequally burden female employees. 
                                                            
41 Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co ,Inc. 444 F.3d. 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
42  Id.at 1107(The specific policy is listed below…)  
“Beverage Bartenders and Barbacks will adhere to these additional guidelines… 
 Males:. Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited.. Hands and fingernails 
must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times. No colored polish is permitted.. Eye and facial makeup 
is not permitted.. Shoes will be solid black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) soles..  
Females:. Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be worn down at all times, 
no exceptions.. Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with employee's skin tone. No runs.. 
Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic nail art or length.. Shoes will be solid 
black leather or leather type with rubber (non skid) soles.. Make up (face powder, blush and mascara) must 
be worn and applied neatly in complimentary colors. Lip color must be worn at all times. (emphasis 
added). 
43 This template showed the female employees a recommendation as to what makeup should be used given their 
facial features. 
44  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1114 (Pregerson, J., Dissenting). 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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The “unequal burden” test asks whether the actual effects of the appearance regulation adversely 
affect one gender more than the other.
47
 The court did not find one in this instance and likened 
the makeup requirement to a requirement for males, but not females, to wear ties.
48
 The court 
also found unpersuasive the argument that it costs far more money and takes more time for 
women to dress and groom themselves in a manner acceptable than their male counter parts, 
asserting that this was not general knowledge deserving of judicial notice.
49
 Finally, the court 
noted that men had to comply with many dress requirements, and that this weighed against the 
Plaintiff’s argument that women were being unequally targeted.50 As one scholar put it, the logic 
of the majority demonstrated that “the unequal burdens test is not only difficult to meet, but also 
depends largely on the subjective standpoint of the judges who are applying it.”51 
The dissent strongly criticized the approach taken by the majority. Judge Pregerson 
asserted that the employer was discriminating against female employees on the basis of sex by 
forcing them to conform to gender stereotypes, namely by requiring them to wear makeup. As he 
put it “quite simply, her termination for failing to comply with a grooming policy that imposed a 
facial uniform on only female bartenders is discrimination ‘because of’ sex. Such discrimination 
is clearly and unambiguously impermissible under Title VII, which requires that gender must be 
irrelevant to employment decisions.”52 He criticized the majority’s reasoning that the “Personal 
Best” policy was acceptable because there were some gender neutral requirements in the dress 
code; for example, the employees had to wear the same color clothes. To him this seemed 
                                                            
47 Id. 
48 Id. (citing Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir 1977).  
49 Jesperson, 444 F.3d. at 1114 
50 Id. 
51 Amy Lifson, Enforcing Femininity: How Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co. Leaves Women in Typically Female 
Jobs Vulnerable to Workplace Sex Discrimination, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 849, 876 (2008). 
52 Jesperson, 444 F.3d. at 1114. 
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inconsistent with the holding in Frank. Using the majority’s logic, the employer in Frank could 
shield themselves from liability if they were to require women, but not men, to meet a medium 
body frame standard if that requirement were imposed as part of a physical appearance policy 
that also required men to meet any level of upper-body fitness, no matter how slight.
53
 
 In summary, the current case law stands for the proposition that an employer may impose 
an appearance policy which differentiates according to gender as long as it does not impose an 
“unequal burden” on either males or females. Additionally, the fact that a woman is required to 
wear makeup, nail polish or hair that requires styling does not, as a threshold matter, satisfy the 
unequal burden test despite the additional time it may take women to comply. Courts may also 
be unwilling to recognize the financial burden that these requirements may impose on women. 
Nor is the employer required to adduce evidence that productivity requires gender-based 
appearance discrimination.”54 In sum, deference to the employer still persists, as courts will not 
tell an employer “how to run his shop” unless dress code policies are unconscionably 
discriminatory.  
Part II- Sex Stereotyping in Price Waterhouse and the Unequal Burden Test 
 Before criticizing the current standard, it should be noted that the Ninth Circuit should 
have based its decision in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in a case involving sex 
stereotyping.
55
 Sex stereotyping involves situations where a man or woman is judged based on 
assumptions of what men and women should or should not do. For example, an employer who 
fires a woman from a job because they feel she should be at home raising children would 
                                                            
53 Id. at 1116. 
54 Karl E. Klare, For Mary Joe Frug: A Symposium on Feminist Critical Legal Studies and Postmodernism: Part 
Two: The Politics of Gender Identity: Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance , 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
1395, 1418 (1992). 
55 See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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reinforce the traditional and outdated stereotype as women as the caregiver and homemaker. 
Courts have consistently stated that “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes” and make them irrelevant 
in any employment decision.
56
  
 In Price Waterhouse, a woman brought suit under Title VII claiming that she was not 
promoted in an accounting partnership because she was not “feminine enough.”57 Although 
“none of the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year had a comparable record 
in terms of successfully securing major contracts for the partnership,”58 she was nonetheless 
denied promotion due to low performance evaluations. In ruling for the plaintiff, the Court noted 
that the employee “proved that Price Waterhouse invited partners to submit comments; that some 
of the comments stemmed from sex stereotypes; that an important part of the Policy Board's 
decision on Hopkins was an assessment of the submitted comments; and that Price Waterhouse 
in no way disclaimed reliance on the sex-linked evaluations.”59 Like the employee in Jespersen, 
this woman was punished for failing to conform to how her employers felt she should look and 
act. Specifically, her employers found that she was too aggressive for a woman and could use “a 
course at charm school” where she could learn to walk and talk more femininely, wear make-up, 
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry in order to come off as more ladylike.
60
 The Court 
explicitly condoned such behavior, stating that an employer could be found liable if they 
punished someone for not conforming to traditional and outdated stereotypes,
61
 and further 
adding that "Title VII does not permit an employee to be treated adversely because his or her 
                                                            
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 235. 
58 Id. at 234. 
59 Id. at 251. 
60 Id. at 256. 
61 Id.  
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appearance or conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender roles."  Justice Brennan found 
that the statute was explicit on this point, noting that the purpose of Title VII was to forever 
“forbid employers to take gender into account in making employment decisions.”62 Therefore, a 
female employee who is treated adversely based on how they dress should have a claim if they 
can show that these requirements are based on stereotypes of what women should wear. 
 Other federal courts have used this language to allow for more claims to be brought under 
Title VII.
63
 Even the Ninth Circuit, the court that decided Jespersen, has broadened the scope of 
Title VII litigation in light of the ruling.
64
 However, in Jespersen the court abruptly narrowed 
Price Waterhouse to only apply to cases involving sexual harassment
65
 and maintained that the 
less stringent “unequal burden” test was necessary when looking at dress codes.66 As they 
reasoned… 
“There is no evidence in this record to indicate that the policy was adopted to 
make women bartenders conform to a commonly-accepted stereotypical image of 
what women should wear. The record contains nothing to suggest the grooming 
standards would objectively inhibit a woman's ability to do the job. The only 
evidence in the record to support the stereotyping claim is Jespersen's own 
subjective reaction to the makeup requirement.”67 
However, a requirement that a woman wear makeup or her hair in a certain way, etc. are 
objective stereotypes of how we as a society feel women should dress. It seems 
                                                            
62 Id. at 239. 
63 See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 572 (7th Cir. 1997). 
64 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The initial judicial approach taken in cases such as 
Holloway has been overruled by the logic and language of Price Waterhouse.”). 
65 Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1083. (“[A]lthough we have applied the reasoning of Price Waterhouse to sexual 
harassment cases, we have not done so in the context of appearance and grooming standards cases, and we decline to 
do so here.”). 
66 As the court stated, “We concluded that grooming and dress standards were entirely outside the purview of Title 
VII because Congress intended that Title VII only prohibit discrimination based on ‘immutable characteristics’ 
associated with a worker's sex.” Id. at 1112. 
67 Id.  
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incomprehensible that Jespersen can be rationalized when the Supreme Court has stated that “as 
for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could 
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group.”68 Going against the Court, the employer in Jespersen evaluated his employee based 
on something other than her work performance, something that Title VII was mean to prohibit. 
Would Price Waterhouse have been decided differently if the accounting firm had instead 
imposed a dress code that required that the female employees wear makeup and go to charm 
school? Given the holding in Jespersen, it seems that the answer would be yes as long as men 
had to conform to some form of appearance regulation. 
 
Part III- Female Expectations of Beauty and the Inherently Unequal Burden 
 Attractiveness matters.
69
 Allowing employers to impose dress codes permits them to 
model their employees as they feel proper.
70
 In fact, this is precisely what the “Personal Best” 
program sought to accomplish.
71
 The major problem with the current interpretation of the 
“unequal burden” test is that it fails to recognize that requiring women to wear makeup, meet 
weight requirements, and do things such as wear heels reinforces traditional stereotypes that 
impose an inherently undue burden on females. Many feminists argue that appearance and dress 
code regulations not only restrict women from expressing their true identity, but also subordinate 
                                                            
68 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251. 
69See Karen Zakrzewski, The Prevalence of Lookism in Hiring Decisions, 7 U. PA. EMP. L. 2 (2005)  (discussing how 
employers tend to favor “attractive” people in hiring decisions.). 
70 See Facial Discrimination: Extending Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical 
Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2035 (1987). 
71 See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1077 (“The goal of the program was to create a ‘brand standard of excellence’ 
throughout Harrah's operations, with an emphasis on guest service positions.”). 
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women to men.
72
 The employer may not act knowingly, but what is considered “appropriate” in 
the office place tends to reflect white, male and heterosexual ideals about appearance.
73
 These 
regulations maintain the sexual subordination of women as they reflect patriarchal views about 
what women “should” look like.74 Unfortunately, this concern is not appreciated by courts, 
which generally seem to view these Title VII claims as unimportant.
75
 Instead they created a 
watered down Title VII analysis in regards to dress codes, even though Title VII does not make 
exceptions for particular areas of employment.
76
 In doing so, they perpetuate this subordination 
of women.  
 The identification of beauty as being attributed primarily to women dates back at least as 
far as Ancient Greece, where philosophers, in discussing virtue, attributed female beauty to good 
character.
77
 Women have continuously attempted to conform to Western ideas of beauty over 
time by physically injuring their bodies.
78
 For example, in the late 18
th
 century, many women 
used a particular substance to give them a fair complexion even though many died from using 
it.
79
 Additionally, corsets were worn by many women into the 20
th
 century made of wood, iron or 
steel. Intended to make women’s waists appear slimmer, the device caused “organ displacement, 
headaches, fainting, and breathing problems.”80 This process of injuring the body to conform to 
                                                            
72 See, e.g., Catharine A. Mackinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in Feminism Unmodified, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 32 (1987 ). 
73 Karl E. Klare; For Mary Joe Frug: A Symposium on Feminist Critical Legal Studies and Postmodernism: Part 
Two: The Politics of Gender Identity: Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 
1395, 1431 (1992). 
74 Id. at 1421. 
75 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Teamsters Local No. 633, 511 F.2d 1097, 1098 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 875 (1975) (describing case  involving a dress code issue as a "tempest . . . brewed in a very small teapot") 
76 See id.. at 1083 (J. Thomas, dissenting). 
77 See generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER, FEMININITY 35 (1984). 
78 See Julie M. Spanbauer, Breast Implants as Beauty Ritual: Woman’s Sceptre and Prison, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 
157 (1997). 
79 Id. at 165. 
80 Id. (citing LOIS BANNER, AMERICAN BEAUTY 10 (1983)). 
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cultural visions of beauty continues to this day, particularly in regards to breast augmentation.
81
 
As one scholar put it, “we accept it as part of our culture because women voluntarily engage in 
the practice and also because society at large is probably unaware of the level of pain, damage 
and even deformity that can result from a “successful”… surgery.82  
 In regards to hair, the modern practice of “Brazilian Keratin treatment,” a method of 
straightening female hair, has raised concerns about its alarming health risks.
83
 This process has 
spread in popularity throughout the United States even though it contains as much as ten times 
the safe amount of Formaldehyde, a dangerous carcinogen. In spite of this fear, salons charge as 
much as $800 for the procedure and it continues to grow in popularity.
84
 
Specifically in regards to weight, women are under considerably more pressure than 
males in regards to societal expectations.
85
 Naomi Wolf, in The Beauty Myth, argues that even as 
women have advanced in many areas, our society has created a cycle of self-loathing in regards 
to how they should view their bodies.
86
 According to Wolf, advertising has created a theoretical 
object she dubs the “Iron Maiden,” the contemporary ideal of beauty.87 This Maiden is 
unrealistic in her appearance, especially in regards to weight,
88
 and women suffer physically and 
psychological as they try to meet this vision of beauty. For example, 40% of women who smoke 
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say they do so to maintain weight.
89
 Additionally, recent studies have shown that women use far 
more diet pills and are exponentially more likely than men to have eating disorders.
90
 Women 
also are considerably more likely to be unhappy about their bodies, even if they are not 
medically obese.
91
 A survey of college females found that, in listing their concerns about their 
lives, the overriding “problem” in their lives was their weight; “all wanted to lose 5-25 points, 
even though most were not remotely overweight.”92 Due to these physical and psychological 
results, Wolf argues that in many ways, women live a worse life than their ancestors.
93
  
 The informal nature of the unequal burden test (i.e. its lack of explicit factors to look at in 
analyzing what constitutes an unequal burden) injures women because the media constantly tells 
them that they must toe a line between being “businesslike” and “feminine”94 Additionally, 
women are under the extra burden of trying to look “sexy.” As one scholar put it, “hotness has 
become our cultural currency, and a lot of people spend a lot of time and a lot of regular, green 
currency trying to acquire it.
95
 Although it is technically impossible to conform exactly to the 
Iron Maiden, women spend considerable time and energy attempting to look like her as a way to 
be viewed as acceptable.  
High heels, although worn by many women, have adverse physical consequences to those 
who wear them.
96
 In a study by the Journal of Applied Physics, it was discovered that women 
who chronically wear heels have shorter fibers in their calf muscles and have to use more energy 
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to cover the same distance as non-heel wearers even when they were wearing flat shoes.
97
 
Additionally, they experience medical problems when exercising. “In a person who wears heels 
most of her working week,” the Doctor performing the study said, the foot and leg positioning in 
heels “becomes the new default position for the joints and the structures within98. Any change to 
this default setting,” he says, like pulling on Keds or Crocs, constitutes “a novel environment, 
which could increase injury risk.”99 These health problems were not found in older women; most 
of the people in the study were in their twenties.
100
 These risks are not prominently discussed in 
the mainstream, as a cursory look at the internet for articles on high heels usually discusses how 
important heels are as they allow woman to have raised buttocks, giving the wearer a younger 
looking physique. Given that these medical risks of wearing high heels seems rather conclusive, 
it seems to per se burden women by requiring that they wear clothing which can negatively 
affect their health while not requiring the same of males. 
 It should be noted that African American women may suffer even more than their 
Caucasian counterparts in sacrificing their physical and mental health to become an “Iron 
Maiden.” Devon Carbado and Mitu Gilatu have argued that people of color “have a greater 
incentive to perform comfort strategies” than others in order to “fit in” at work.101 Therefore, 
they will likely exert extra energy in order to conform to traditional models of what women 
“should do” because they are at an extra risk of being ostracized in the office place. This extra 
work can be exhausting as they must juggle acting in this manner with performing their work.  
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Unfortunately, in wearing the necessary clothes and makeup to “fit in”, women open 
themselves up to sexual harassment from employers and fellow employees, who in many 
instances justify their behavior by saying that the women “asked for it” by dressing in a sexual 
manner in the office place.
102
 It is of no concern that were they to not dress in such a manner, 
they may be ostracized like the women in Price Waterhouse or Jespersen. Rather than blame 
their employees and actively litigate, many women blame themselves for the harassment. “Two-
thirds to almost nine tenths of [women] experience harassment that they blame on themselves 
and their appearance.”103 Requirements or expectations that women wear makeup and certain 
dress also injure women financially. Statistics show that they make less than their male 
counterparts, yet “urban professional women are devoting up to a third of their income on 
“beauty maintenance... [seen as] a necessary investment.”104  Requirements on makeup, hair, 
dress, etc. also hurt women physically. A disproportionate number of professional women say 
they feel tired most of the time and lack the energy for the “kind of social activism or 
freewheeling thought that would allow them to question and change [the patriarchal system that 
perpetuates self-loathing] itself.”105 In sum, women have to spend more time and money than 
men in order to be viewed as professional in the workplace, and in doing all of this their actual 
work product suffers.  
 Some could argue that women should negotiate with their employers in order to secure a 
more gender-neutral dress code. However, this fails to appreciate that the employer is at a 
considerable position of power over their employees when negotiating the terms of employment, 
specifically their dress code preferences.  Female employees are at a disadvantage in regards to 
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their employer usually because they tend to need the job more than the employer needs them.
106
 
In fact, “the costs of exit from employment are frequently very high particularly for long term 
employees who have invested human capital in a job.” 107 Therefore, they likely will not be able 
to negotiate with their employer for a favorable policy, and likely will just endure so as to keep 
their job. Therefore, many policies that clearly violate Title VII under even the most conservative 
view of the “unequal burden” test are never litigated. Courts need to be aware of this fact, and 
should be more vigilant in striking down appearance regulation.  
 Additionally, given the aforementioned ideals about what women “should” look like, 
many female employees accept the dress codes as being par for the course in regards to 
employment. Why challenge an employment policy that simply asks that women comply with 
visual standards that the media and, more generally, society imposes on them? In fact, even in 
the absence of a dress policy like the “Personal Best” requirements, many women would still 
dress in that manner because that’s what they may feel they “should” do. 
The unequal burden test, as presently construed, continues to perpetuate this ideal by 
viewing as acceptable requirements for women to meet with a coach to assist them in applying 
makeup, have their hair teased, wear heels, etc. It is true that many feminists are reluctant to 
deny women the right to dress how they see fit as a means of expressing themselves.
108
 However, 
the law should have no place in requiring women to conform to the patriarchal system of beauty. 
Any decision by women to wear heels, makeup, or curly hair should be their own, and certainly 
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should not be mandated by employers. Giving women the choice to dress or not dress as society 
deems appropriate is how they can finally repossess their own bodies.
109
 
 As a result of these and other concerns, scholars have presented a variety of ideas on how 
the test should be changed. One idea is to use a reasonable person test with recognition that our 
society should base work on performance, and not appearance.
110
 This test has positives, 
however it suffers from the same problem as the “unequal burden” test. In implementing an 
objective test, we still allow for majority androcentric views about how women should dress to 
thrive.  
Another interesting theory is posited by Allison Steinle.
111
 She argues that “courts have 
the capacity to efficiently and equitably put the teeth back in Title VII by applying the same 
considerations to appearance and grooming standards cases as they do to immutable status Title 
VII claims.”112 This would mean using the test articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell 
without lowering the standard of review for appearance regulation. This seems to follow the 
rationale of the dissent in Jespersen.
113
 Effectively, this would only allow for gender neutral 
dress codes which required proper grooming and hygiene as they could be applied uniformly. 
 At first blush, this approach seems to provide the desired result. Women will likely be 
free of any dress requirements which reinforce notions of what is appropriate for them. However, 
this test fails to realize the interplay that exists between race and gender. An employer could 
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legitimately require that all employees have clean cut hair. This seems acceptable under the  
McDonnell framework. However, this could pose serious problems to African American women. 
Part V- African Americans and the Concept of Hair Independence 
“Hair seems such a little thing. Yet it is the little things, the small everyday realities of 
life, that reveal the deepest meanings and values of a culture, give legal theory its 
grounding, and test its legitimacy.”114 
  Steinle’s call for treating appearance regulation cases with the same analysis as 
immutable status Title VII claims fails to recognize the unintended negative consequences that 
this would have on African American women. Steinle argues that hairstyle grooming 
requirements are, under her test, acceptable because they can be applied equally to men and 
women without overly burdening either gender; requiring short, well groomed hair doesn’t 
involve any physical traits that cannot be changed.
115
 However, to many African American 
women, hair style is intimately related to their immutable characteristic; wearing their hair in an 
afro or braided is a fundamental way that they identify with their African ancestry. They cannot 
simply “choose” whether or not to wear their hair in an Afro or braided just as much as they 
could choose to be African American. 
Paulette Caldwell, among others, has commented on the significant importance hair 
styling is for many African American women: 
 “For black women, [hairstyle] choices… reflect the search for a survival mechanism in a 
culture where social, political and economic choices of racialized individuals and groups 
are conditioned to the extent to which their physical characteristics, both mutable and 
immutable approximate those of the dominant racial group.”116 
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 The use of hair by African Americans as a cultural expression appears to have gained 
national prominence during the civil rights movement.
117
 Several scholars have stated that 
American concepts of beauty have long rejected natural African American hair as being 
unsightly; dating back from antebellum days when hair was the primary indicator of their 
inferiority.
118
 This may be because in many African cultures at the time (and up to the present 
day) many Africans styled their hair as a way of recognizing their status, identity, and 
ancestry.
119
 Upon arriving to the Americas in bondage, many slaves had their hair shaved for 
sanitary reasons. However, as far back as the 1850s scientists were arguing that Africans were of 
a lesser species than Whites in part due to their wooly hair.
120
  Additionally, “with pride 
being a factor as well as needing to not offend White people, house slaves were often given time 
for grooming and slave women were encouraged to iron their hair straight in the manner of their 
White counterparts.”121 Many Blacks living in the antebellum South recognized this stereotype 
and tried to straighten their hair using axle grease or dirty dishwater with oil.
122
 “Slaves knew the 
ideal of beauty didn’t fit them,” says Neal Lester, chairman of the English Department at 
Arizona State University.
123
 In fact, Madame C.J. Walker, the first African American female to 
be a millionaire, made her fortune selling hair straightening products.
124
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Over time, African Americans began to reject the straightening of their own hair to 
conform to white views of attractiveness. The radical shift became evident in the 1960s as 
prominent leaders in the African American community, such as Malcolm X, came to reject 
processes such as “conking,” a practice of chemically straightening one’s hair, as a misguided 
attempt to “look white.”125 As he put it:126 
“This was my first really big step toward self-degradation: when I endured all of 
that pain, literally burning my flesh to have it look like a white man’s hair. I had 
joined that multitude of Negro men and women in America who are brainwashed 
into believing that the black people are “inferior”—and white people “superior”—
that they will even violate and mutilate their God-created bodies to try to look 
“pretty” by white standards. “127 
 Additionally, African American poets like Nikki Giovanni railed against African 
Americans straightening their hair. In her poem “On Liberation,” she says “Black people these 
are the facts.. Where’s your power... Honkies tell niggers don’t burn… but they insist on 
straightened hair, they insist on bleaching creams… it has been pointed out… 
the last bastion of white supremacy is in the Black man’s mind”128 Others artists such as 
Gwendolyn Brooks and Lucille Clifton voiced similar concerns.   
In addition to insisting on wearing their hair naturally, many African Americans view the 
use of braided hair as a similar manifestation of their inherent identity; they are making 
assertions of the self that stand in stark contrast to “the characteristics and appearance of the hair 
of whites.”129 There is evidence that cultures in Africa have braided their hair as early as 500 
B.C.E. "Hieroglyphs and sculptures dating back thousands of years illustrate the attention 
                                                            
125 MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1965). 
126 This was recounting the first time he underwent the procedure at a barber shop. 
127 Id.  
128 NIKKI GIOVANNI, On Liberation, in THE COLLECTED POETRY OF NIKKI GIOVANNI 1968-1998 (2007). 
129 Caldwell, supra note 114 at 111. 
What Not to Wear   24 
Africans have paid to their hair. Braids were etched into the back of the head of the majestic 
sphinx."
130
  
This trend continued in the United States. “African in origin, the practice of braiding is an 
American- black American- as sweet potato pie.” Some slaves, especially after the abolition of 
the international slave trade, were able to have slightly more autonomy; some had one day off for 
church. On Sunday, many “women would gather and braid everyone’s hair; on this day everyone 
‘let their hair out’ without wearing scarves. After everyone’s hair was done, the women would 
attend church where everyone could view one another’s hair. All the women’s hair would be 
braided in elaborate patterns and designs which would remain in for the rest of the week but once 
again hidden under a scarf to keep it nice.”131  
Like Afros, braided hairstyle has lived on as a political statement for many African 
Americans, as evidenced by Cicele Tyson, who wore braided hair to the Academy Awards for 
that purpose ten years before it was popularized in the main stream by a white actress.
132
 To 
belittle this use of braided hair is to “make invisible all of the black women who for centuries 
have worn braids in places where they and their hair were not overt threats to the American 
aesthetic.”133  
As Paulette Caldwell, a prominent scholar on this subject, noted… 
“I want to know my hair again, the way I knew it before I knew that my hair is 
me, before I lost the right to me, before I knew that the burden of beauty – or lack 
of it – for an entire race of people could be tied up with my air and me.”134 
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 Given these feelings, Caldwell has argued that African American hair and the 
wearing of it naturally or in braids is not as much a choice as it is a manifestation of their 
immutable characteristic, their racial identity. To enforce appearance regulation which 
allows for bans on these hair styles, therefore, is unlawful discrimination under Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act. 
Courts certainly have not been receptive to any argument that a ban on braided hair or 
likely, Afros, offends Title VII, rationalizing that these are not an immutable traits.
135
 In a 
prominent case involving hair styles, an African American women claimed discrimination, in 
relevant part, on Title VII grounds challenging her employer’s dress policy prohibiting braided 
hair.
136
 The court ruled for the employer, noting that the policy was addressed to both men and 
women and because there was no factual evidence that this policy only practically affected 
women.
137
 In response to the idea that an all-braided hair style is “a part of the cultural and 
historical essence of Black American women”, the court first noted that “the defendants have 
alleged without contravention that plaintiff first appeared at work in the all-braided style after… 
the style had been popularized by a white actress” in a major motion picture.138 In this way, the 
court insinuated that White people wear braided hair, thus belittling their cultural significance to 
African Americans. They then went on to say that since corn rows are artificially made and easy 
to remove, they did not count as an immutable trait.
139
 Furthermore, the defendant’s assertion 
that the airline had a right to “project a conservative and business-like image” was found 
reasonable by the court in justifying the prohibition. 
140
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 In another case, a black female employee at a detoxification unit was terminated for 
refusal to remove or cover her “corn rows” and attached beads, which violated the company 
dress code.
141
  In rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that her hair style was an expression of her ethnic 
culture, the court claimed that it could not accept “that the wearing of beads in one's hair is an 
immutable characteristic, such as national origin, race, or sex. Further, this court cannot conclude 
that the prohibition of beads in the hair by an employer is a subterfuge for discrimination.”142  
These courts seem to adopt an analysis similar to the one called for by Steinle. Put 
another way, the reasoning of the Rogers and Carswell courts would still withstand the proposed 
Title VII scrutiny because, practically speaking, hair styles are not immutable. That logic allows 
American Airlines to “enforce its view that it might lose sales if some flight attendants or ticket 
agents wear corn rows, despite the consequences to African-American women in hurt, shame, 
and impaired employment opportunity.”143 It should be noted that the Rogers court stopped short 
of saying that a policy that prohibited a natural Afro hairstyle would violate Title VII.  Other 
courts seem to waffle on this issue as well. For example, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of a 
plaintiff who was denied a promotion because her employer stated she "could never represent 
Blue Cross with [her] Afro." 
144
 In the court’s opinion, “a laypersons description of racial 
discrimination could hardly be more explicit.”145 However, it should be noted that this case was 
the result of a derogatory statement by an employer. Were there a neutral policy that happened to 
be violated by an Afro, the court likely would have reached a different conclusion. In only one 
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instance was such a policy explicitly found to be in violation of Title VII, and that was an 
administrative court ruling.
146
  
Part VI- “An Unequal Burden Test with Bite” 
 Were courts to read Price Waterhouse as prohibiting any type of sex stereotyping, then 
arguably the concerns about discriminatory treatment against women in general could be 
alleviated. Any dress code which differentiated between men and women could be invalidated 
since differentiation “because of” gender would per se violate Title VII unless the employer 
could prove their discriminate treatment meet the “bona fide occupational qualification.” This, as 
aforementioned, is likely to fail. However, given that the “unequal burden” test has been used 
consistently since its inception, it appears that courts like the Ninth Circuit are unlikely to change 
course unless the Supreme Court hears a case explicitly about appearance regulation. 
 The alternative solution is to maintain an unequal burden test, but to recognize where the 
starting point is for measuring the “burden.” We should start by honestly analyzing the cost and 
time necessary for employees of each sex to comply with the policy.
147
Additionally, we must 
never allow for a policy which reinforces traditional stereotypes of how men and women should 
dress, especially if they physically harm women. Therefore, requirements about makeup, high 
heels, and others would immediately be subject to scrutiny under Title VII. Second, given the 
severe health issues that have followed in regards to body image and females, any weight 
requirement would be acceptable only if it fell under the BFOQ exception. Finally, courts should 
take note of the fact that hairstyles often have cultural roots, especially in regards to African 
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Americans. All dress policies should recognize “cultural manifestations” of their immutable trait, 
their African American identity. This identity has been subordinated throughout American 
history and Blacks should be allowed to reclaim that identity in the face of Caucasian views of 
professionalism. This would mean that employers would be unable to ban Afros or “braided 
hair” when their only justification is to project a “professional and businesslike office place.” 
 One could argue that this test has an enormous flaw. Where does it end?  Couldn’t any 
employee claim that the way they are dressed is a “manifestation” of their immutable trait? 
Richard Ford argues that, by allowing for discrimination claims to be brought on the basis of 
discrimination of “some Black women” and not others, we weaken Title VII. He specifically 
mentions Rogers and states that many Black women oppose wearing corn-rows.
148
 If that is the 
case, then how could we prohibit an employer from banning the practice of wearing them when 
it is unsettled whether or not the practice lies at the “cultural essence” of Black women? 
 Although this argument has merit, even Ford agrees that some African Americans view 
braided hair as a necessary manifestation of their immutable trait. Given the fact that African 
Americans have been so flagrantly discriminated against in our country, it seems that courts 
should recognize the unique need for African Americans to reclaim an identity that for hundreds 
of years was denied to them. As aforementioned, African Americans have been pressured to 
make their hair look more “white” for centuries. Many wear their hair in a natural Afro or in 
braids as a means to reclaim their identity. Unless an employer can show that short, straight hair 
is needed for a reason other than to portray a “professional image,” we should not deny them this 
opportunity.  
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Part VII- Conclusion 
Courts, when analyzing a Title VII challenge to an appearance regulation, should impose 
an “unequal burden” test which recognizes the inherent burdens that historically are imposed on 
women in regards to makeup, weight, and other dress in the office place. Additionally, courts 
should recognize that, especially in regards to African American women, wearing hear in an 
Afro or braided is a “manifestation” of their immutable trait, their African heritage. 
 
 
 
 
 
